**First topic: game theory redistribution**

**IDEA!!! Redesign ultimatum game – If we both give a third person receives, If only one of us gives, we get it back.**

**SGH**

1. **„The price of virtue” V.Foster**: Authors ask “what are people willing to pay for services provided by charitable sector”. Attempt to measure the value of the sector in terms of willingness to pay (WTP). This is fucking amazing, they used different techniques including questionnaires to measure this WTP. **Chapter 5** gives a summary of these attempts. If we can find a WTP that doesn’t materialize because there is no market, we can try to capture it. “Morality is not irrelevant, but it must account adequately for opportunity cost. Second part of the book is about how we go about capturing the extra WTP. **Chapter 6** says tax incentives not great (countereffect of less after tax money). Chapter 7, efforts of fundraisers most important, chapter about most efficient methods for approaching donors (I don’t care). Part III is a discussion, “social capital”. **Chapter 10** gives conclusions on capturing WTP.
   1. **Ch 1. Conceptual foundations:** Welfare economics, social welfare function. Bethamite utility function, change in welfare. Authors show how they use it specifically for charities.
   2. **Ch 2. Value of charities for the general public:** Interesting distinction, “tax efficient” vs not “tax efficient”. Chapter 2.3 is gold for my paper!!!! Note: how do I show that people would give more according to my game theory?
   3. **Ch 5. The aggregate benefits of the charitable sector, summary:** Last paragraph – there seems to be a gap between WTP and actual contributions, maybe for the gov. to fill with grants?
   4. **Ch 6.** **Providing fiscal incentives for giving:** In this chapter there is an overview of literature on charitable giving, picture in phone.
   5. **Ch 10.** **Conclusions and policy implications:** Pictures o phone

Welfare economics. Free riding and perceived transaction costs are the biggest reasons for the WTP surplus. 3 suggested methods for tackling this: gov. grants, fiscal incentives for giving, increased charity fundraising efforts. Tax incentives turn out to be inefficient(inecastic correlation), fundraising better. !! ch.6? By reducing fiscal incentives and giving money straight to charity might be better for the Exchequer. !! Social cost of raising funds may be greater for the charity than for the tax men! Government grants win, best of the three!

Continue notes!!!

1. **”The bounds of reason” H.Gintis:** The book looks cool. It’s new and open mided about game theory.
   1. **Ch 3. Geme theory and human behavior**
      1. Page 57-.., “The rationality of altruistic giving”!!! “public goods game” “inequality aversion”

GARP

3.1.5 Conditional altruistic cooperation- this is gold, these are my taxes – Toshia Yamgishi(“bounded rational reciprocity… 1999”) + Kionari, Better! (“Social exchange and reciprocity” 2000)

3.1.9 Altruism and cooperation in groups. Public goods game. Continue notes!

* + 1. Page 82-85, Public Goods Game across countries. “antisocial punishment”. Very interesting, picture on my phone.

1. **Advances in public economics: Utility, choice and welfare:** not useful for me
2. **Games, Rationality and Behaviour, Essays A.Innocenti:** 
   1. **I.2 Social norms in Game Theory**
   2. **I.3 Risk aversion…**
   3. **II.4 Inequality aversion!!!**

Experimental results differ from expected game outcome, because of social preferences (bibliography in phone photo). <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantal_response_equilibrium>

4.7 Conclusion – “(…) Zimbabwean villigers dislike being better off as well as being worse off than average.

* 1. **II.5 Norm compliance**
  2. **IV.10 Inrquality or Strategic Uncertainty**

1. **Set Functions, Games and Capacities in Decision Making:** First part very mathematical, maybe something in **chapter 5 Decision Under Risk and Uncertainty.** The Allais paradox.
2. **Game Theory in Action, Stephen Schecter:** Seems interesting, comprehendible examples of games
   1. **6.10 p 173The Samaritan’s dilemma:** what if my helping discourages someone from helping himself?
   2. **2.4 Israelis and Palestinians,** interesting
   3. **2.5 Global warming,** spending 0 strictly dominant.Is this similar to a game I would be considering?
   4. **Chapter 8, Alternatives to the Nash equilibrium** This is good! Photo on my phone. Evolutionary stability, something my prof likes.
   5. **10.7 Cooperators…,** photos on my phone
3. **Collective Decision Making Van Deemen/Rusinowska:** Note to self**,** Arrow’s theorem, remind myself. Overall book very mathematical and specifiv and not for me.
   1. **Chapter Rights Revisited, And Limited,** refers to Collective choice and Social Welfare
   2. **Different approaches to influence based on social networks and simple games.** Bibliography photo on my phone, maybe in the bibliography there is something relevant for me.
4. **Find this book! (w gablotce przy wejsciu do biblioteki sgh)** [**https://www.amazon.com/Taxes-Trust-Coercion-Compliance-Ukraine/dp/1108420427?tag=duckduckgo-ffab-20**](https://www.amazon.com/Taxes-Trust-Coercion-Compliance-Ukraine/dp/1108420427?tag=duckduckgo-ffab-20)
5. **Polityka publiczna… Osiński.** 
   1. **Uwarunkowania finansowe polityki publicznej Żurkowska:** OECD bada takie rzeczy jak stosunek podatków do PNB i koszt pozyskiwania podatków, tu omówione wiele takich wskaźników.
6. **Polityka społeczna… Osiński.** Chyba niezły podręcznik, kontynuować, znaleźć coś o public finance! \
7. **Polityka społeczna… Orczyk** Doktrynalne uwarunkowania polityki społecznej
8. **Super Freaconomics, chapter Unbelievable stories about apathy and altruism (see notes end of book)**

[**https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/magazine/09Psychology-t.html**](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/magazine/09Psychology-t.html)

[**https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/index.html**](https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/index.html)

[**http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/jep%20revision%20Levitt%20&%20List.pdf**](http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/jep%20revision%20Levitt%20&%20List.pdf)

[**http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/486/1/0106\_dictator\_game.pdf**](http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/486/1/0106_dictator_game.pdf)

[**https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/magazine/09Psychology-t.html**](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/magazine/09Psychology-t.html)

[**https://blog.philanthropy.iupui.edu/2019/02/15/dr-john-list-the-science-of-the-economics-of-philanthropy-and-the-partnership-of-two-thought-leaders/?utm\_source=feature-box&utm\_campaign=blog&utm\_medium=web190215**](https://blog.philanthropy.iupui.edu/2019/02/15/dr-john-list-the-science-of-the-economics-of-philanthropy-and-the-partnership-of-two-thought-leaders/?utm_source=feature-box&utm_campaign=blog&utm_medium=web190215)

[**https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/index.html**](https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/index.html)

more to explore from freaconomics bibliography!

1. **University Papers**
   1. [**https://blog.philanthropy.iupui.edu/2019/02/15/dr-john-list-the-science-of-the-economics-of-philanthropy-and-the-partnership-of-two-thought-leaders/?utm\_source=feature-box&utm\_campaign=blog&utm\_medium=web190215**](https://blog.philanthropy.iupui.edu/2019/02/15/dr-john-list-the-science-of-the-economics-of-philanthropy-and-the-partnership-of-two-thought-leaders/?utm_source=feature-box&utm_campaign=blog&utm_medium=web190215)
   2. **https://etheses.lse.ac.uk/**
2. **Papers from SSRN**
3. **Economics, Acemoglu List:** 
   1. **Chapter 9 Gov. as provider of public goods**
   2. **chapter 13 Game Theory:**

\*more notes in “konspect”

Trusting Bernie Madoff - extended prisoner dilemma that gives a socially inefficient result that in practice is not always the case because trust can be built, reputational concern is key.

* 1. **chapter 18 Social Economics** pics on phone

p445 – lowering taxes decreased charity! Because deductions became less valuable, the price of charity increased.

Pure vs. impure altruism, door to door study found 75% was social pressure, sume skipped schedguled solicitation, but those who didn’t spent more.

Friend Foe gameshow, watch on youtube

Introducing fairness penalty to a game.

Tax system as an ultimatum game where finally the workinhg class rejects the offer?

Willingness to punish unfairness is scale sensitive, 1$ vs 1000$

Ult game in rupees to raise the stakes.

* 1. **Ch 21.4 Income inequality**
  2. **Ch 15Time and risk**
  3. **Ch 16 econ of information**

1. **Models, Mathematics, and Methodology in Economic explanation Katzner –** Little actual math, its like, general philosophical?
2. **Taxes and Trust, Berenson –** bibliografia!
   1. !!! Economists (Joel Slemrod) view tax collection as ‘rationak decision making under uncertainty’ – “why people pay taxes” “Hobbesian model”
3. **Readings in public choice… Rowley, Part V Applications** \*pics on phone, super bibliography AMAZING, LOOK INTO THOSE PICS
   1. 22 Public Finance Harvey Rosen (from “Encyclopedia of public choice”) , Answer to my prof about connection?
      1. Scope of the field: Both positive and normative analysis, for example “Is it fairer to tax income or consumption”. “Modern pub fin focuses on microeconomic functions of the government, (…) how the government should affect the (..) distribution of income.
      2. Methodological Basis: “It would not be unreasonable to public finance as just an area of applied microeconomics”. Normative framework provided by welfare economics, concerned with social desirability. Pareto-efficiency seems a reasonable normative criterion, and underly most of welfare economics. “However, even a state pareto-efficient, may not be socially desirable. A society might be willing to trade some efficiency in return for a fairer distribution of resources (although fair harder to define).” Furthermore, market failures, like there is no market for clean air.
      3. Public expenditure - “The theory of welfare economics focuses our attention on market failure and distributional considerations as reasons for considering governmental intervention.”
         1. Public goods-
         2. Externalities – Taxes on externalities, efficiency are for further research
         3. Social insurance – Market fails to provide an efficient amount of insurance (Akerlof 1970), because of adverse selection, mandatory soc ins solves this problem. Contentious issue of various models of health insurance.
         4. Income redistribution: “If society determines the current distribution as unfair, it need not mess with commodity prices, but redistribute income. Problems arise if thaxes themselves induce in efficiencies. Different attitudes towards redistribution, Atkinson 1983 says there is no problem if we have social mobility, (but that paper I read!).
         5. A caveat – Gov intervention not necessarily a solucion, mighyt be inefficient or politicians having different goals, should be evaluated case by case.
      4. The theory of taxation: How to levy taxes to enhance efficiency and promote fairness – welfare economics provides analytical framework
         1. Tax incidence(economic and statutory, who bears the burden): fundamental problem here is how taxes change prices, how responsive supply and demant are to prices. In some cases there is still great controversy, for ex taxes on corporations.
         2. Excess burden: when loss in welfare is greater then revenues collected. Calculations of excess burden suggest it is pretty high, ex Iorgenson and Yun, 2001)
         3. Optimal taxation: “efficient taxes should distort decisions al little as possible”. “optimal policy depends on the extent to which society is willing to tradeoff efficiency for rairness (Auerbach and Hines, 2002)”
      5. Revenue raising instruments:…
      6. Public finance and public choice: Public choice is much more skeptical ebout the government than public finance.
      7. \*extra literature- Yun “Investment vol.3: lifting the burden / Holcombe “Tax policy from a public choice perspective”
   2. 23 Taxation, Winer and Hettich
      1. Intro: Fantastic definition and basics of taxation. “some branches of fiscal literature make the link between progressive taxation and redistribution their main focus, (…) how income taxes are determined as part of the political struggle over a societies income shares.
      2. \* additional lit: Boadway Keen 2000 “redistribution” / Kenny and Winer (2006) “Tax systems in the world” / salanie 2003 “the economics of taxation” / Stiglitz 1987 “pareto efficient and optimal taxation…” / Hettich and Wiener 1999 Democratic choice and taxation + 2002 “Rules politics…” in Wagner Backhaus “handbook of public finance” !!!
      3. Basic issues :
         1. Two major approaches: 1.Buchanan, taxes as exchange to obtain public goods. Lindahl equilibrium -tax shares decided in collective bargaining. 2.Ramsey,Pigou,Mirlees – tax only indirectlu linked to expenditure. !!! “In second approach, decision processes are taken as exogenous. Assumption of a social planner who makes decision on behalf of the collectivity according to an exogenously given welfare function.”
         2. A comprehensive approach with collective choice: Positive analysis. Hettich 2002 says that there is a similar underlying structure in revenue systems despite many variations!!! “If we follow methodolical approach that underlies economic theory, we can interpret observed tax systems as equilibrium outcomes of economic and political processes and forces. But nooooo, the author says we need to take the firs approach from the earlier point, “the assumption of a social planner does not provide a meaningful starting point for anlalys of collective choice processes!
4. **Public Finance, Harvey S.Rosen G.11635**
5. Wagner Backhaus “handbook of public finance” (aa, jest I tu I w BUW)
   1. Hettich and Winer “Rules, politics and normative analysis of taxation:
      1. Intro: Critical analysis of different rules about “good taxation” with regard to how they address collective choice. “We argue for a more complete approach that includes an appropriate treatment of collective choice as an integral part”.
      2. Basic issues in pub fin: “Rules and norms of taxation must be evaluated in a broader context that acknowledges the reasons for compulsory taxation together with the collective nature of political institutions relied upon to make fiscal decisions.
      3. Rules and norms in relation to the basic elements of public finance. – basic elements of public finance: 1.separation of tax and spending and its implication for the socially efficient use of resources. 2.Determination of redistribution through the fiscal system. 3. Necessity for non-market or collective choice mechanisms to allocate public sectors burdens or benefits.
         1. Outcome oriented rules(planner who bypasses the need for collective action):
            1. 4.Harmonisation: international neutrality.
         2. Process-oriented:
         3. Critical assessment of the above. harmonization – tradeoff between gains from coordination and losses from disciplining intergov competition(states as companies).
         4. Ch 5 p 130 !!!Hettich Winer 1999 Chapter 4 – Probabilistic voting Nash equilibria in the context of tax analysis Pareto-Optimal. Znaleź to!.
      4. Ch 6, Holcombe – Ahthor doesn’t agree with Hettig Wiener that political incentives create an efficient system. Political costs (campaigning for change in taxes as cost), the solution to this, proposed by buchanan, is a strongly fixed tax constitution. Return to this!!!
      5. Ch 18 Fiscal Sociology, an alphabet p 528,Bachaus
         1. “fiscal illusion”. Suggestins for research, about taxes in EU!
6. Ch14 Redistributution, poor relief, and the welfare state, Wagner. Mentions utility, skeptical of redistribution, exertions vs opporunity
   1. 2. Contractual arguments for welfare state redistribution:
      1. Hochman Rodgers “Pareto Optimal Redistribution!!!” – a choice theoretic expression of private charity. If the rich persons utility derived simply from the fact of making a transfer, there would be no argument for collective provision, it is then necessary to postulate that the donors utility depends on the aggregate amount of doinations. MY IDEA. In this formulation, potential individual donors face a form of prisoners dilemma. Each donor would prefer to make a contribution in conjuncture with others, it is individually rational however for each donor to withhold his own contribution because it has an imperceptible impact on the aggregate(free rider). A claim results that poor relief is a collective good that will be under-supplied through private charity.
      2. The author is still scepticall, “the collectivization of poor relief may fare less well once consideratiopns of political interests are introduced”
   2. Controversy stems from different beliefs about the source of poverty. Wagner thinks ideally there should only be redistribution to those who are poor by chance. Privately organized assistance would be more efficient in recognizing who “deserves” help. This is not do encourage destructive behavior. Buuuulshiiit!.
   3. “a welfare state creates at least two sets of interest groups that have interests that support the maintenance of poverty and dependence”. These are the providers of services with legislative committees, and the recipients. “the treatment of income redistribution in economics is mistreated, both normative and positive literature speaks as if there were a unified program of nondiscriminatory transfers among broad income classes”. The interest group theory of government emphasizes the gov. as a redistributive process, but animated by the interests of well-organized groups and not by some fiscal philosopher’s vision of benevolence.
   4. Interest group theory of government – redistribution from the unorganized many to the organized few.
7. **Natural justice Ken Binmore**
   1. Ch 2, bargaining \*pics on phone
      1. 2.6 social indeces
      2. 2.7 the utilitarian bargaining solution
      3. 2.8 egalitarian bargaining solution
      4. 2.10 enforcement
      5. 2.11 Cultural evolution
      6. 2.12 Hersanyi (utilitarianism) and rawles(egalitarianism) were rivals, but maybe they are saying the same thing in different ways?
   2. Ch.11 egalitarianism
      1. 11.5 Fair social contracts , self policing I think!
8. Public Finance, Rosen – good textbook!

**BUW**

1. Discours sur l’inegalite JJRousseau (diskurs uber die ungleichheit)
2. Economics of public Finance, Cedric Sandford. 1983. One interesting bit on page 290 about how the contemporary trend of inequality reduction might reverse because of inflation vs real estate value and the “capital transfers tax”
3. Finances Poubliques, Bouvier
   1. Les critiques relatives a la procedure de la decision politique en matière fiscal. P679
      1. Totalirarisme de 51% - selon P.Salin, “L’Ile des Pingouins” Anatole France. Kenneth Arrow quote: “la doctrine de la souverenite des electeurs est incompatible avec celle de la rationalite collective”. Mueller Public Choice: “trzeba by jednomyslnosci I powiazania podatkow z ich przeznaczeniem”. Impot comme un quasi prix. „l’impot c’est le vol”
   2. L’homme debiteur des dieux p588: la dette est la form prototypique du lien social. Le ritual sacrificial pourrait etre pecisement considere comme le moyen pour les hommes de s’acquitter d’une dette particuliere, celle du sens profond de l’univers. Hommes/dieux 🡪 hommes/hommes.
   3. Les theories modernes du consentement a l’impot: (p594-606)
      1. L’impot echange: l’impot assurance. Turgot “L’impot est la contribution que la societe entire se doit a elle-meme pour subvernir a toutes les depenses publiques”.
      2. L’imot solidarite: Edgeworth 1897 “une justification scientifique a l’impot progressif”. L’impot negative, revenue minimum guarranti,
   4. **La legitimite politique de l’impot: le consentement de l’impot…:** Koniec ciekawego tutaj
4. Social Policy towards poverty, Friedrich ebert stiftung, Stanislawa Golinowska

20.02.2019

1. Essays on economic decisions under uncertainty Denize?

21.02.2019

1. Podstawy ekonometrii I teorii prognozowania Dorota Witkowska

24.02.2019 i 26.02.2019

1. Społeczny kontekst ekonomii, Szlachta: jedyne ciekawe p113 „Zmniejszanie nierówności jako jeden z celów zrównoważonego rozwioju ONZ” Jastrzębska: dobre podsumowanie o nierówności, też dobry wzór pracy!

Bibliografia przydatna, foto na telefonie

Mączyńska! „Dysfunkcje gospodarki w kontekście ekonomii kryzysu (zeszyty naukowe PTN 2011 n9 s61)

Te info na początek mojej pracy jako uzasadnienie wagi tematu?

1. Principles of economic sociology Swedberg
   1. Table 7.4 page 182, percentage of people in poverty post and pre transfer \*pic on phone. Karl Polanyi, Ways of organizing nomy, pics on phone
   2. Shumpeter “Capitalism,Socialism and democracy”, Max Weber „the protestant ethic”
   3. In the preface: The author sais Econ Sociol could become a type of analysis alongside GT and Behav Econ. “follow the interests” “”institututions not a set of rules but a distinct configurations of interests and social relations”.
   4. Chapter 7 Politics and the Economy , “fiscal sociology” for example. P172 social attitudes toward various forms of gov activity, reduce difference in income got 38% and Italy 80%.
      1. Fiscal sociology(Finanzsociologie): Blomert 2001. Bodin quote “financial means are the nerves of the state”. **“How the generation of income and its expenditure by the state and other political authorities affect the political authorities themselves, the economy, and the rest of society”!!!** Shumpeter “Crisis of the tax state”, he thought the state would decline if high taxes disincentivized from work.
         1. Fiscal sociology today: Musgrave 1989. Campbell 1993, “what determines tax policy”, “role of philanthropy”!, “more political parties mean higher taxes”!
   5. Chapter 8 Law and the Economy, “Legal dimension to economic phenomena”. “studying the role of law in the ongoing economy” as the main task of economic sociology. “jurisprudence of interests”. Hume says “society realizes law is in their own and public interest”. Richard Posner turned law and economics into a general approach in jurisprudence, ex book Economic Analysys of law. Kaldor-Hicks confcept of efficiency, “EXCHANGE IS EFFICIENT IF THERE IS AN INCREASE IN SOCIAL WEALTH”, used by POSNER. Coase Theorem(dound not useful in reality, Polinsky. I don’t think any tax was mentioned in this chapter.
2. Prospect Theory Peter P. Wakker – **Looks very promising return to make notes**
   1. 3.8 Taxation and welfare theory with cardinal utility :
      1. Arrows paradox (read about in in Gura/Mahler, I though ok, no best solucion we have to work with what weve got). Young(1990) – tax rates in different countries, find this!!!.
3. Economy/Society Carruthers(author mentioned by Swedberg) Naan – look into this one
4. International Encyclopedia of economic sociology – look into this one too
5. Relationship economics Robison Ritchie – look into this
   1. Intro, p 8-9 – Government vs private giving! Pic on phone. Fuck, they say us international giving is more private than through government and good. Fuckkkkk. P10 great quote from hirshleifer 1994
6. Readings in economic sociology Biggart – look into this maybe
7. Handbook og the fundanentals of financial decision making Mac Lean – summary and critique of prospect theory? Maybe more useful stuff
   1. Ch13 Risk aversion and expectd utility theory – the chapter scepticly looks at laboratory experiments with small stakes, because we don’t care about small stakes as diminishing marginal utility would predict – pics on phone
   2. Ch6 Prospect theory Kahneman – Original paper!
   3. Ch7 Prospect theory much ado about nothing? Levy - difficult math, pics on phone
   4. Ch8 But then this guy Wakker sais prospect theory is actually supported by levy? Pics on phone
8. Teoria gier Binmore -fajny krotki podręcznik dobre tlumaczenie
   1. Wstep 1
      1. Gry polityczne
      2. Binmore „natural justice”
      3. Hume zniszczyć swiat żeby podrapać się to racjonalne
      4. John rawles – awersja wobec ryzyka jest racjonalna , check him out!, ale neumann niby już to uwzglednil
      5. Alternatywne interpretacje teorii gier- racjonalne roziwazanie problemu, i dochodzenie w procesie ewolucji, na tym polega moc predykcyjna teorii gier
      6. Uzasadsnienie w obronie równowagi nasha ma charakter cyrkulacyjny
      7. Ewolucja wyeliminowala społeczeństwa bez podatkow!!! Moja myśl!!! Rozdzial w pracy?!!
   2. Los 2
      1. Gra więźnia nie przekłada siie na działanie społeczeństwa. Według autora nie trzeba wyjasniac paradoksu racjonalności, na przykład przez imperatyw kategoryczny Kanta. W dylemacie więźnia powtarzanym bez końca wspolpraca staje się rownowaga, ale to inna gra, „wet za wet”.
      2. Strategie mieszane, randomizacja, nie do końca zrozumialem ale to chyba dla mnie nie kluczowe. Hmm, autor mowi, ze z tego wynika,ze nieglosowanie w wyborach jest racjonalne, p37. Przykład z rzutami karnymi, gdzies już o tym czytałem. Gra minimaksowa zakłada, ze wsechsiat wyznaczyl cie jako swojego osobistego wroga 😊 Na końcu rozdzialu, p47, pojedynek, może to najlepiej wyjasnia te dylematy
   3. Czas 3
      1. Ekstensywna postac gry, postac drzewa. Indukcjka wsteczna, teoretyczne zalety i praktyczne wady na przykładzie gry w szachy.
      2. Hipotezy kontrfaktyczne -hipotetyczne pyania maja sens w teorii gier, np. dlaczego alice nie wejdzie na jezdnie pod samochod? Bo spodziewa się, ze on w takim wypadku ja przejedzie.
   4. Konwencje 4
      1. Dylematy społeczne – narzeka na lewakow. Co teoria gier może nam powiedzieć o dostępnych efektywniejszych rozwiązaniach? Dobry rozdział!!! Picxs on phone
      2. Imperatyw kategoryczny Kanta jest naiwny. Przykład ludzi czekających na bagaż.
      3. Tragedia wspólnego pastwiska. Autor broni czysto racjonalnego niezyczeniowego podejścia teorii gier.
      4. Można się dogadać, ale czy wierzyć?
   5. Wzajemnosc 5
      1. Gry powtarzane, okreslona ilość niewiele zienia, a nieskończenie zmienia strategie w dylemacie więźnia na golab(p85), strategia GRIM.
      2. Kara – brak odwzajemnienia to tez kara, której można oczekiwać.
      3. Altruizm? – Jeżeli przypiszemy graczom preferencje altruistyczne to zagrają strategie golab(wystarczy zmienić wyplaty). Pytanie jak bardzo ludzie dbaja o siebie a charakter empiryczny i teoria gier się nie wypowiada. P87 akapit o placeniu podatkow, trzeba audytować bo w obliczu oszustow ci placacy czuja się jak durnie.
      4. Twierdzenie ludowe. **„Ewolucja kooperacji” Axelrod!!!! „wzajemny altruizm” Robert Trivers. Autor pisze,twierdzenie ludowe urzeczywistnia spostrzezenie filozofow politycznych, ze nie potrzebujemy zewnętrznej agencji żeby wspolpracowac. !!! Wedlug autora najwieksze korzyści z rozwoju teorii gier dostępne teraz w obszarze problemów niedoskonałego monitoringu,to terra incognita.**
      5. **Wet za Wet Axelrod, symulacje. Autor krytykuje , ze GRIM lepsza, Axelrod ma za dużo koniecznych warunków, np. działa tylko w parach. Wet za Wet slaba, ale ogolne twierdzenie ze ewolucja pozwala nam kooperować jest spoko.**
      6. **Obowiązek, wymierzanie kary przez reszte społeczeństwa, nie pokrzywdzonego.**
      7. **Rola emocji – grozba gniewu w niektórych sytuacjach utrzymuje rownowage w gtrze.**
      8. **Gniew one-shot ultimatum game**
      9. **Biologia ewolucyjna – pics on phone**
      10. Skonczylem na p.
   6. 8 ewolucyjna teoria gier
9. **Redystrybucyjna funkcja finansów publicznych w ujęciu teoretycznym, Walasik: glowny podzial na czesc deskryptywna i dezyderatywna**
   1. S14, dobra definicja Pigou kiedy transfer bogactwa ma sens
   2. Black „on the rationale of group decision making” – medianowy wyborca, ponizej popra, powyzej odrzuca redystrybucje. “Encyclopedia of pc – The median voter model” Rowley
   3. Becker mówi o pressure groups
   4. Person Tabellini 2000 plaszczyzny konfliktu miedzy grupami interesow
   5. ”median voter based on altruism”, “median voter based on social insurance”, Epple Romano “Public choice of minimum income”, !!! MOJE Husted “Nonmonotonic demand for for income redistribution benefits. The case of AFDC” , Bernasconi “redistributive taxation in democracies evidence on peoples satisfaction”
   6. Mueller “Public choice III” !! Good classification of redistribudion, as taking, as insurance, as fairness.
   7. Strona 39!!!! Powiązanie redystrybucji z GAME THEORY !!! Wzory uzytecz nosci. KONIECZNIE WROC DO TEGO.
   8. **Redystrybucja jako ubezpieczenie p 41.** Fajna funkcja maks uzytecznosci z ubezpieczeniem. Mój pomysł to połączenie tego z równością?! Hansson Stewart „progressive tax…”. Sinny „theory of welfare state” – proponuje ze wraz z poczuciem bezpieczeństwa wzrośnie sklonnosc do ryzyka, ogolnie dochody się podnisa, i będą większe nierownosci (najpierw spadna potem wzrosną) - !!! mogłbym to zbadać na danych!!! Vickrey „philanthropy and public policy”. Brennan „pareto desirable redistribution ,public choice” mowi ze funcje ubezpieczenia spelniaja raczej transfery niepieniężne.
   9. Redystrybucja jako public good: Hochmann Rogers „Parfeto optimal redistribution” – zaleznosc uzytecznosci jednostki od dochodow innych jednostek. Przymus placenia jest po to, żeby uniknąć jezdzca na gape. Model Hochmana Rogersa, opiera się na zalozeniu, ze jeżeli uzytecznosc danej jednostki jest uzalezniona od dochodu innych to redystrybucja jest wręcz konieczna do redystrybucji pareto. To jest świetne, funkcja optymalnej redystrybucji zalezna od wagi jaka przywiązujemy dochodowi innych, P50. Tutaj Free rider to ten problem o którym ja mówiłem, że ryzyko przy charity, ze inni nie zaplaca.
      1. LL Orr „Income transfers as public good, AFDC” – podobny model, ale przyjmuje ze kazdy ma inne preferencje i potrzeba decyzji politycznej!.
10. **Finanse z Perspektywy młodego badacza** – niespecjalnie ciekawe tematy, ale podejście może?
11. **Economics of the public sector** – Stiglitz, p.395 Tax reform(fairness)
12. \*taka ciekawostka– **BDO “Opodatkowanie inst finansowych”**
13. Etyka, sprawiedliwość, I racjonalność w dorobku nauki o finansach Ostaszewski Super ciekawe!!! O kurwa pics on phone
    1. Etyka podatkowa Andrzej Buszko p73
    2. Preferencje podatkowe…regula Edynburska Davida Ricarda p 161
       1. Ricard rule –„leave tchem as you find them”
       2. “Idee sprawiedliwości podatkowej ulegaly przemianie. (…) Aprobata dla ciezarow podatkowych uznawanych za sprawiedliwe znacząco zmniejsza opor podatkowy i sklania do uczciwszego realizowania obowiazkow fiskalnych”!!!
14. The philosophy … of finance O’Sullivan
    1. Neologism: The case of financialization – interesting bibliography, pic on phone
15. Matematyka w ekonomii Ostaszewski
16. Political Liberalism John Rawles – nie wiem czy coś konkretnego stąd mogę wziąć
17. Elements of moral cognition , Mikhail – this is a modern followup to rawls, see blurb by Chomsky pick on phone – veeery linguistical 😊

**WNE**

1. **"teoria wyboru publicznego" Jerzy Wilkin:**

"the center for study of public chcice"madonna univercity

O.Williamson - czołowy przedstawiciel nurtu

Teorie normatywne, czyli propozycja optimum

!!!Tutaj polecają książkę którą też zdjąłem z półki "teoria gier w ekonomii i n. społ" Malawski/Wieczorek/So.

G.Lissowski

Gilotyna Humea

prekursor kierunku- Duncan Black "On the rationale of Group dec. making"

James Buchanan "public choice:origins of ..."

j.s Coleman "a rational choice perspective..." "handbook of economic sociology" „individual interests, collective action”!!!

Coleman!- możliwość poprawy użyteczności poprzez zrzeszenie się kontroli!

Neoklasyczna ekonomia?

Morawski- człowiek spoleczno ekonomiczny

Coleman-proces rqcjonalnej rekonstrukcji społeczeństwa!

Szkóła Chicagowska(Coleman,Becker, lepsza od Virginii i Rochester zainteresowanej USA I konfliktem)

Olson -teoria grup interesu

Polecają literatura:

Mueller "public choice III" i Rawley "public choice theory"

+ Buchanan "finanse publiczne w warunkach demokraci" miklaszewska "filozofia a ekonomia", Nutt"economics of p.choice",Lissowski, porebski"umowa spoleczna"

Piszą tu o Arrows theorem!

Funkcja maksimum Rawlesa

Optymalnosc Pareto- przypomnieć pojęcie

Ekonomiczna teoria demokracji

Podatek Pigou! Skąd ja to pamiętam?

Rozdział 6„ekonomia konstytucyjna” – James Buchanan definicja, kryterium efektywności Kaldora-Hicksa!! Hayek – spontaneous order. Pozytywna ekonomia konstytucyjna, tutaj wzmianka o ekonomii eksperymentalnej. Ekonomiczna analiza prawa (law and economics).

Rozdział 3 „teoria wyboru społecznego:

3.7 – twierdzenie Arrowa, lub tw. o niemozliwosci: 4 aksjomaty które nie mogą być jednocześnie spelnione. Kaldor-Hicks odpowiedzia na arrowa?(to mój komentarz). Osłabienie wymogu „niezaleznosci od alternatywy” umozliwiloby branie pod uwagę intensywności preferencji, ale jest kwestia manipulacji skalami przez organizujących glosowanie. Wymog racjonalności może można by zasstapic, nie koniecznie dostając najlepszy wynik, ale postrzegany jako najbardziej sprawiedliwy (jak w turnieju tenisowym gdzie jest element losowy trafiania na rywali”.

3.9 - Normatywne funkcje dobrobytu społecznego i użyteczność kardynalna:

Funkcja dobrobytu Bergsona-Samuelsona. Na podstawie funkcji porządkowych nie da się wybrać pomiedzy stanami pareto optymalnymi. Maksimum Rawlsa – dobrobyt = osobie w najgorszym polozeniu, Rozne funkcje daja nam pareto optima, trzeba wybrać etycznie. Mueller Public choice vw bibliografii

Inne książki które oglądałem: Kopczewska "Ekonometeia oni statystyka z wykorzystaniem języka R"

Malawski " konkurencja i kooperacja, teoria gier" rozdział 10 użyteczność a ryzyko , rozdział 21 .... .....eksperymenty a teoria gier - badamy odchylenia od postulowanej racjonalności

1. GT with economic applications Bierman Fernandez: \*pics on phone
2. Artificial Economics, Mathieu Beaufils – book not useful but maybe the general field of Agent-based computational methods? Preface pictured on phone.
3. Game theory and public policy Roger A. McCain – good basic book but nothing on tax

Good very short intro to GT

Evolutionary Stable Strategy as refinement of Nash equilibrium, works with bounded rationality.

Ch7 Social mechanism design: 2007 noble prize for “social mechanism design!!! Revelation principle.

Pigou set out a systematic normative economics from Mill’s rule-utilitarian ethics. Then Arrow came with his impossibility. Consensus game NIMBY?

1. Handbook of game theory with economic applications vol.3, Auman Hart (These are 3 separete books!)

Ch19 Game and Decision Theoretic models in ethics: John c.Harsanyi

Ch21 GT and statistics:

Ch22/23 Differential games?:

Ch24

Ch25

Ch26

Ch27

Ch28Ch31 Social choice!

Ch 33 GT and public economics

Ch 34

Ch 39 utility and subjective probability

Ch 40

Ch41 strategic equilibrium

Ch52 econ history and gt 3-many examples of gt analysis in game theory but nothing on taxes. Conclusions in pphoto on phone

Ch53/54 Shapeley value

Ch58!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Tax and redistribution!continue notes, photo



Ch60 legal rules and institutions

Ch 61

Ch 62

1. **"teoria gier w ekonomii i n. społ" Malawski/Wieczorek/So. G.Lissowski**
2. Economics of taxation James Nobes: pics on phone
   1. P70 – optimal taxation
   2. P77taxation and equity
3. Public choice Mueller continue, hmm but seems very ideological
   1. 527 – fiscal illusion
   2. 536 – welfare losses from taxation: quite simple algebraic formula he suggests for commodity taxation. It is a loss in welfare but smoller than the gain in tax! “taxes on labour significantly increase labor costs causing higher unemployment and an overall loss in competitivebess for a country” – (my note – this seems simplistic, stupid even)
   3. 547 – Government size and economic performance (pic on phone) – author advocates small government
   4. 561 Part V Normative public choice
   5. 563 Ch23 Social welfare functions – Hersanyis social welfare function with risk!!! Author suggest what he thinks is best
   6. Ch 24 Arrow, implications, pics on phone
   7. Ch 25.5 Binmore!1!!! – self policing social contract. Critical pics on phone!!!
   8. Welfare function! Social Contract! Ton of info!
   9. Rawles

**Lectures**

1. MIT Collective choice course – only relevant part pictured below
   1. 
2. MIT Public policy: chapters from Gruber, Jonathan. Public Finance and Public Policy. 3rd ed. Worth Publishers, 2009. ISBN: 9781429219495.
   1. 
3. Behavioral economics and finance!!! – eh, maybe nothing original
   1. Fairness – ultimatum game
4. MIT insights from game theory into social behavior
   1. Slides on cooperation without looking
      1. Otwieranie koperty
         1. Cooperate without looking is an Nash equilibrium, but not consciously chosen, rather because of heuristics/ideologies. Without rationality we need another justification for Nash!!! So we use dynamics, more successful becomes more frequent by imitation.
         2. Simulation with 5000 trials!!! Seed population with random strategies, wait for the population to stabilise, and classify the outcome.
         3. I didn’t quite get the conclusion
      2. Puzzle, why do religions reward anonymous giving?
         1. Maybe tradeoff between everyone admiring a little, and a few who find out admiring a lot. No proof here, this looks pretty weak
      3. Fast cooperation, slow greed. Cooperation intuitive!!, Cooperate less when we slow down! “Spontaneous Giving and Calculated Greed” Rand, Joshua, Greed. Thinking about taxes slow, charity quick!!! Why would people cooperate intuitively? Model suggests it’s a way of not looking. We prefer to interact with intuitive not deliberate cooperators!

**Papers**

1. **“Poverty and aspirations failure” Dalton, Ghosal, Mani http://hummuseconomicus.pl/bieda-i-kleska-aspiracji/**
   1. Zbudowali model który zakłada, że ludzie nie różnią się niczym poza początkowym bogactwem. jeśli Antoni jest początkowo dwa razy biedniejszy od Barnaby, to aby doścignąć go w końcowym stanie majątku, musi dokonać dwa razy większego wysiłku. A wysiłek, jak wiadomo, boli(zmniejsza użyteczność)
2. Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution <file:///C:/Users/dell/Desktop/licencjat/SSRN-id1520886.pdf>
3. Ernst Fehr und Klaus M. Schmidt:The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism –Experimental Evidence and New Theories. This Ernst Fehr is great! <https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/726/1/Fehr-Schmidt_Handbook_2005-Munichecon.pdf>
4. **What Do Laboratory ExperimentsMeasuring Social Preferences RevealAbout the Real World?Steven D. Levitt and John A. List** <https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.21.2.153>
5. What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences tell us about the real world? Levitt List https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.21.2.153

**Home**

1. **Psychologia Ekonomiczna**
2. p29 psychologia makroekonomiczna, Epstein Raaji, samuelson nordhaus,

p35 psychologia finansowa, Warneryd

reinhard selten?

Ajzen – The theory of planned behavior

Kahneman Tverskjy – prospect theory

Hausman – psychology of economics p70-98

Swieringa – laboratory experimentation in accounting

1. Racjonalne zachowanie

Hofstede 1991 –tolerancja na niepewnosc, spoleczenstwa o niskiej, poszukują bezp. np. w prawie

Trzy warunki racjonalności, omówienie ich realności

Tyszka – psychologiczne pułapki oceniania i podejmowania decyzji

Ryzyko! Bernoulli paradoks petersburski, Daniel Bernoulli, maksymalizacja uzytecznosci

Funkcje uzytecznosci indywidualne, neumann morgenstyern, znowu trzy warunki (te warunki dalej naruszalne, np. przyjecie zakładu z ruina fonansowa o znikomym prawdopodobieństwie)

SEU, subjectively expected utility

Teoria perspektywy Kahnemann!

Simon – ograniczona racjonalność b

1. Percepcja działań ekonomicznych:
   1. P90 percepcja ryzyka ekonomucznego –
      1. Czy ludzie racjonalnie szacują ryzyko? No właśnie, czy racjonalnie szacują ryzyko przy płaceniu podatków i działąniu dobroczynnym?
      2. Różne podstawowe pojęcia – wiedza,poczucie wpływu, dobrowolność narazania się, natychmiastowość, nieodwracalność strat, katastrofalność strat, poczucie leku, uwaga mediów, utożsamianie się z sytuacja, rozkład zyskow i strat, schemat na str 95.
      3. Blad w mysleniu o ryzykowności – gdy cos wydaje się ryzykowne to mamy sklonnosc do zanizania oceny zyskowności. Cos jest albo dobre i przyjemne albo zle i szkodliwe
2. 5 Własność i posiadanie \*zbyt silne przywiązanie do własności, \*bibliografia rozdzialu
   1. 5.3 wlasnosc i motywacja
      1. Motywacyjna funkcja własności. Paradoks, mam a boje się uzywac. Diminishing marginal utility.
      2. Zawisc o cudze mienie.
      3. Wlasnosc wspolna i jej psychologiczne implikacje: „tragedia wspólnej laki”, „dylemat wolnej jazdy”.
      4. Instynkt posiadania: Żródła antropologiczne, Zachowania dzieci (niektóre badania wskazują na kulturowe podloze). Podejscie socjobiologiczne: samolubny gen, altruizm tez ma tu sens!, zjawisko potlaczu (cygara? 😊), indywidualiz/kolektywizm/materializm roznice w kulturach,.
3. 8 Dylematy społeczne